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The Modern Churchman.

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SIGNS OF THE TIMES.

Double Event.

To-day educated Englishmen learn their theology, if they arn at all, from magazines and libraries rather than from e pulpit. The steady output of books by Liberal Churchen forms, therefore, an important feature of their work on half of the Christian Faith. It is, however, an event of me significance when a volume by the President of the urchmen's Union and a volume by the Chairman of the uncil both appear in one week. We publish a review of rofessor Gardner's book, *Evolution in Christian Doctrine*, in is number of the *Modern Churchman*. Canon Glazebrook's lume, *The Faith of a Modern Churchman*,[1] was designed to pear as the first volume of the Modern Churchman's brary. Circumstances, however, have compelled it to pear second, but our readers having loyally bought, read, d assimilated the first volume of the library, Mr. Fawkes' *nius of the English Church*, will now be in a position to do e same by Canon Glazebrook's, of which we hope to publish review in our next number. The Bishop of London annually commends to the laity of his Diocese a specially selected lume for their Lenten reading, shall we be greatly daring, we presume to recommend these two volumes to our aders for the same purpose?

[1] John Murray. 2/6 Cloth; 1/6 Paper Covers.

Round about the Reviews.

There is an interesting article in the *Contemporary Revie* of January by Miss Edith Picton-Turberville on the liturgy o the Church of England. She demands, as we have all don considerable changes in the Anglican Liturgy, which, beautifu and historical as it is in many respects, does not meet the nee of the day. Miss Picton-Turberville considers the service lack much in arrangement and reality, and are not true in the representation of Christian feeling.

> "The commandments," she says, "on the surface present to th worshipper an entirely untrue and primitive idea of God, a conceptio presented in byegone ages by one who obviously believed in other god but was sure that his special one was the greatest of all. God presented as jealous, punishing vindictively those who hated Him, an being kind to those who love Him. . . . It is not too much to say th Sunday after Sunday God is maligned in His house. From the steps the altar we are given the impression that He is jealous, that He visi the sins of those that hate Him, and is merciful only to those who lo Him. How strange this sounds to those who remember the words Jesus: 'He maketh the sun to rise on the evil and on the good. . . The Decalogue gives an impression of God out of harmony with th teaching of Christ, a negative conception of duty which has had th tragic result of leading many people to believe that religion consists an abstaining from certain things."

Miss Picton-Turberville concludes that the result of liturgy that is unreal and partly untrue is that many cann reconcile it with their consciences to attend the Church service They quietly drift away, and are stigmatized as careles It is a relief when now and again instead of the Decalogu Christian worshippers hear the two Christian commandmen in which are fulfilled all the law and prophets. After the wa Miss Picton Turberville predicts, the nation will want worship in sincerity and truth within the walls of the Moth Church. If we cannot be sincere even in our Church, can w hope to be so as a nation in everyday life?

There is a remarkably frank and outspoken article in th *National Review* of January by Mr. M. H. Temple, a wel known London journalist, which deserves attention. It dea with the "Failure of the Church," and calls upon the Chur

of England to give some answer to the many doubts on religious problems which the war has intensified.

> "Such authority as exists in the Church of England has occupied itself with the beatification of that very doubtful character, Charles the First, and with the expurgation from the Psalter of certain verses which never seemed more appropriate than at the present time. But of everything like an organized effort to come to the help of the people whose faith is shaken to its foundations by this grim but most undeniably real figure of war, there is hardly a trace. Convocation fiddles while the Church is burning."

Mr. Temple deals with the necessity of accepting the results of modern historical research and criticism; with the action of the Bishops in disallowing the younger clergy to serve as combatants; with the pecuniary condition of the Bishops and the parochial clergy, and with the pressing question of clerical education. The reform of the Church, he declares, cannot be attained by a mere change in its constitution. The canker of unreality is eating out the heart of the Anglican Church, and he concludes as follows:—

> "It is of no use to relegate the Athanasian Creed to a back seat, and to hope that by so doing the more ferocious clauses may escape notice, and the confident statements on the nature of the Deity avoid inquiry as to the grounds on which they rest. It is still less use to seek the bases of faith in the decisions of Councils of whose character and procedure a great many people outside the ranks of the clergy are now fairly well informed, and in whose divine inspiration it is, to say the least of it, extremely difficult to believe. Christianity is not a metaphysic to be swallowed, but a life to be lived, and there is no record that its Founder ever asked more from His adherents than personal confidence in Himself. . . . Theology long ago made certain tremendous assumptions, and theologians are pefectly entitled to say that on these assumptions they have as a class argued with entire honesty and with an acumen which has never been surpassed. More acute logicians than the schoolmen are not to be found in any age or in any sphere of intellect. The trouble lies in the fact that the original assumptions no longer wear the appearance of infallible truth, and that the Church is apparently oblivious of the change, oblivious also to the extent to which the new knowledge has shattered conclusions which seemed to have been logically derived. So long as the Church maintains an attitude of suspicion towards every advance in science, and, instead of inquiring what light, if any, a new truth sheds upon her teaching, endeavours to discredit it whenever the two really or apparently conflict, so long will her divorce from the life of the ordinary man remain permanent, and the nation continue to fall away."

THE PRIMATE'S STATESMANSHIP.

The course of events in connection with the Hereford controversy has taken the line we predicted. The Primate has consecrated Dr. Henson; Bishop Gore has declined to proceed to extremities; the E.C.U. party has continued to produce fulminations and appeals.

That an acute crisis has been avoided may be attributed to the statesmanship of the Primate. His Grace's letter to Bishop Gore, in which he firmly denies that the Archbishop is in any Erastian subjection to the authority of the State, constitutes one of those *ex cathedra* utterances which will often be cited in days to come as exhibiting that happy union of loyalty to the Constitution, combined with the strongest assertion of the Archbishop's right not to act against his conscience in the exercise of that loyalty.

It is an assertion of this sort made at a critical juncture which differentiates the statesman from the opportunist. The particular passages of the statement to which we refer are as follows:—

> "I have, as you know, always maintained that in the last resort a large measure of responsibility must belong to the Ecclesiastical authorities, and especially to the Archbishop of the Province, in regard to the filling of a vacant See by the consecration thereto of a priest duly nominated by the Crown. . . . No constitutional rule or usage can force the Archbishop to the solemn act of consecration, if he be prepared, by resignation or otherwise, to abide the consequences of declaring himself *in foro conscientiae* unable to proceed. I should be deliberately prepared to take that course if I found myself called upon at any time to consecrate to the Episcopate a man who, in my judgment, is clearly unworthy of that office, or false to the Christian faith as taught by the Church of England."

The second point in which the Archbishop's statesmanship is seen is in his endeavour to secure from Dr. Henson some such general statement of his belief in the articles of the Apostles' Creed as would satisfy the more moderate of those

who were opposed to his consecration. Nothing would have been easier in view of the charges of the E.C.U. than for the Primate to have written and have asked Dr. Henson: Do you believe explicitly in the historical fact of the Virgin-birth, and in the historical fact of the resuscitation and transmutation of the physical or material body of Jesus Christ on the third day after His crucifixion? The Rev. W. H. Frere, and others shew by their recent letter to the Archbishop that they desired that such questions as these should be put by his Grace to Dr. Henson before his consecration. The Archbishop, however, was well aware, as the former Dean of Westminster pointed out to him some years ago in a notable letter,[1] that to put such questions would be tantamount to elevating to the position of cardinal doctrines of the faith what no Synod of Bishops has declared to be so. Moreover, such explicit questions would have limited that "reasonable liberty" which the Primate in his speech in Convocation on April 30th, 1914, declared to be granted by the passing of that resolution to which Bishop Gore had specially referred in his letter to the Primate.

The Primate has since that time consistently drawn a clear distinction between denial of any of the clauses of the Creed or "disbelief," and a reverent agnosticism which may be unable to affirm them to be historical, but nevertheless accepts them as symbolically true. His letter to Dr. Henson, and Dr. Henson's reply, if their exact significance is to be grasped, must be read in the light of this important distinction.

Those, moreover, who are acquainted with Dr. Henson's books, to which he refers in his letter, will appreciate the terms and tone of his reply to the Archbishop. Whilst urging Liberal Churchmen to read especially his *Sincerity and Subscription* (1903), delivered, it is interesting to note, before the Churchmen's Union on May 28th, 1903, and *The Creed in the*

[1] Written on Ascension Day, 1903, and published as the Preface to *Some Thoughts on the Incarnation.* (1903).

Pulpit (1912), consisting of sermons preached at Westminster, we venture here to cite two important passages from the latter which throw a significant light on his letter to the Archbishop:

> "On the one hand, I approach the discussion of the Creeds from the point of view of one who himself accepts the traditional theology as the necessary basis of teaching; and, on the other hand, I acknowledge that this traditional theology has, in many respects, fallen out of accord with modern theology, and needs to be cautiously but frankly revised. . . . Moreover, I doubt if many 'liberal' theologians remember sufficiently that revision or 'restatement' implies the preservation of the truth which has to be revised and re-stated; that nothing which has disclosed the secrets of the spirit can ever be surrendered, however greatly the form in which it is expressed may vary—that, in short, the Faith is unalterably the same, albeit the formal credenda change their form from age to age." (Preface, pp. ix-x.)

We are aware that the compromise for which the Primate and Dr. Henson stand will not satisfy all Liberals, even as it fails to satisfy many traditionalists. We dare to hope, however, that Dr. Gore's withdrawal from the conflict marks his tacit acceptance of the Archbishop's position. Dissatisfied Liberals on the other hand will do well to remember that the Liberal ideal is not merely the truth, but "the truth in love," and that some self-sacrificing concessions must be made at the present time, if the unity of the National Church is to be maintained. No doubt there are Liberals who feel that the right policy at the present time would be for Liberal Churchmen to put forth a declaration asserting that the character of the historical evidence renders them unable to regard the Virgin Birth and the physical Resurrection as historical facts. Such action at such a time, although it might be a tribute to their veracity and courage, would be, we think, a reflection on their love and wisdom, and only prove a provocative to limit the comprehensiveness of the National Church, which all Liberal Churchmen wish to maintain.

If Truth is the child of God she is also "the daughter of Time," as Bacon tells us, and oftentimes what seems a daring and uncertain decision in one age will appear absolutely secure in the next. Educated Churchmen to-day are not yet so

skilled in historical method, nor so completely possessed of the historic sense that they can be expected to arrive at anything like a unanimous conclusion in regard to debated historical points at the present stage. Let the scientific method, however, have its course; especially let our ordinands and younger laity be trained to understand and to use it wisely, and in a few years' time there will be practical unanimity among educated Churchmen as to where in our religion the sphere of history ends, and the sphere of myth begins. To attempt to force a premature conclusion now, would be a profound and, we venture to think, a most disastrous mistake. Education must precede judgment. To-day the threatened conflict in the Church is not a conflict between faith and doubt, or between loyalty and disloyalty, but between two educational methods —the scientific and the pre-scientific. So long as there be freedom to study and freedom to teach, there need not be any haste to proclaim negative decisions. Theological teachers must be careful to inculcate right methods like the mathematical master who attaches more importance to his pupils using right methods than that they should obtain right answers.

Bacon in his essay *Of Unity in Religion* warns us "to take heed of rending God's Church by two kinds of controversies," the one is when the point controverted is "too small and light," the other when it is "too great." For many Liberal Churchmen to-day, in the face of the great spiritual, moral, and social problems which beset the Church, the points controverted must seem too small and light to justify forcing a disastrous crisis by the assertion of final conclusions in regard to them, unless the E.C.U. party should force an unforeseen situation which compelled Liberal Churchmen as a matter of honour either to affirm explicitly or deny that certain facts are historical. Within a generation, the great bulk of Churchmen, if soundly taught, will probably have come round quite naturally and imperceptibly to views which are now regarded as modernist. To-day decisive declarations would be, we believe, a mistake,

for they would divide the Church; a generation hence such declarations will be needless, as practically all will be in agreement with them. All that Liberal Churchmen need at the present time is the right to teach, and the right to have their share in shaping the policy of the Church. This the Primate's far-sighted statesmanship has granted to them, and they may well thank God, and—we will not add—take courage—we do not think that they lack that, but rather—take full practical advantage of the opportunities which the Primate's policy has given them.

THE UNRIGHTEOUS MAMMON.

For the Church, financial reform is not the most important or pressing of all reforms. When, however, a Church is the Church of a commercial community, bad finance is most detrimental to its influence. A commercial community, whatever its interpretation of the injunction "Lay not up for yourselves treasures on earth," can appreciate the full force of our Lord's saying:—

> "If therefore ye have not been faithful in the unrighteous mammon, who will commit to your trust the true riches?"

Probably never since the days of Lord Brougham has such strong dissatisfaction been felt with the financial administration of the National Church. Notwithstanding the complaints of the poverty of the clergy, a growing number of the laity feel certain that the income of the National Church derived from endowments is quite large enough to meet her normal needs if only she managed it better. This feeling was recently voiced by a distinguished Field-Marshal who publicly declined to subscribe to Church funds until certain obvious financial

reforms were accomplished. Dr. A. C. Headlam's *Revenues of the Church of England*[1] can therefore claim to be a timely publication. As the first step towards the reform of Church finance, the author proposes the appointment by Parliament of a commission to survey, in co-operation with the local authorities, all the parishes of England, and to re-adjust their boundaries and re-distribute their revenues wherever needful. The parson's freehold, he proposes should be managed by the Diocesan Board of Finance through their agent, each parish being taxed from 3 to 10 *per cent.* to cover dilapidations and other expenses. No parish, it is intended, should have an income of less than £300 a year, nor, except in very sparsely populated country districts, a population of less than 1,000.

However, we do not propose here, to reproduce Dr. Headlam's carefully worked out scheme. We would only urge that it deserves most serious study from Church reformers. Besides dealing with the re-distribution of parochial property (which we consider by far the most important financial reform to-day, for it is the poverty of the parochial clergy in comparison with the incomes of the bishops which is the chief cause of scandal), it treats of bishoprics, deans and chapters, clerical pensions and clerical training.

The whole treatment of the subject is clear, concise, courageous, and comprehensive. It cannot, like so many schemes of reform, be accused of tinkering. This does not mean that we necessarily agree with every proposal it contains. We really doubt the need for twenty additional English bishoprics. Motor-cars have changed the situation, and probably a few years hence our younger bishops will be using aeroplanes more swift than Bactrian dromedaries.

What we appreciate particularly about Dr. Headlam's exposition is its sanity and justice. For instance, he would not take away the rights of private patronage. Patronage is property in this country, and the Church has no right to be

[1] Published by John Murray, price 2/6 net.

virtuous at the expense of other people. Dr. Headlam is perfectly clear as to the need of Church endowments. The slavery of clerical poverty is for the Church a far more serious limitation than that of her relation to the State. But apart from that consideration, adequate ministrations, especially in rural districts, are impossible without endowments. Those who are losing sight of the national duty of the National Church to all the population, and wish to work the Church on congregational and sectarian lines are willing to sacrifice her endowments, but even they might learn from America what is the fate of churches without them. Bishop G. A. Selwyn thought that half the parson's income should be derived from endowments and half from voluntary contributions. He would thus be rendered neither entirely dependent nor entirely independent in regard to his flock. The financial ideal for the clergyman as for the Church at large may well be that of Agar, the son of Jakeh: "Give me neither poverty nor riches," or as Dr. Headlam expresses it:—

> "Culture and refinement without the disquieting accompaniment of wealth."

Our author notes that the total value of the endowments which support the parochial clergy averages less than half-a-crown a year for each person in the community, in other words about a half-penny a week. Dr. Headlam takes the unpopular view of the incomes of bishops, and although we know many Liberal Churchmen will not agree with him, we confess that we do. To the argument that episcopal incomes are un-apostolic, and—what is more serious in this age—undemocratic, he replies as follows; to give a bishop a £1,000 a year is un-Apostolic, for no Apostle ever received such an income; moreover it is undemocratic, in the popular use of that term, for the vast majority of his flock have not an average income of anything like that amount. If we believe in Apostolic poverty for the successors of the Apostles, by all means let us urge them and assist them to adopt it by making them

dependent on the alms of the faithful, and their own secular earnings, but do not let us pretend that a reform which gives them a £1,000 or even £300 a year is Apostolic when it is not so. We believe that during the first two centuries at least, no orthodox bishop was paid a salary. The practice was first introduced by heretics and schismatics, and shocked the faithful.[2]

Now-a-days the word democracy has charms like that once possessed by the blessed word Mesopotamia. Since the war, however, our populace has become clearer as to the exact significance of Mesopotamia, but needs further education, notwithstanding the laudable efforts of the Bolsheviks, as to the exact meaning of democracy. Democracy does not necessarily mean either communism or State collectivism, or equality, or fraternity, or liberty. We hope that all who desire democratic government in Church and State, as we do, will note Dr. Headlam's definition of it.

> "Now if democracy means that the State will try to secure that everyone has a fair chance in life, I am heartily with its aims. We hope that, with the experience the war has given us, we may be able to insure in the future that every man who will work properly will get adequate wages, and that for every boy of ability there will be a possibility of attaining any position in the State for which he is fitted.
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> "But it is quite another thing to say that democracy must mean equality. It never can do so if we care for the well-being of the State. It must be recognized that ability, capacity, intellectual effort, industry, will bring a man adequate and substantial rewards, otherwise there will not be the necessary incentive to work. If democracy means opportunities for all, well and good; if democracy means any fancied scheme of equality, it will destroy the well-being of the nation.
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> "So in the Church we hope that every position, from that of Archbishop of Canterbury downwards, will be open to any person of ability, whatever his origin. We should like to see the clergy recruited from all that is best, spiritual and intellectual, in every class of the nation. We want no class distinctions. But we want to make the position of a Bishop or an Archbishop worthy of the Church, and adequate for the work which he has to do."

The important thing is not so much the size of a bishop's income or house, as that he should put them to the very best

[2] See Euseb. *H.E.* v. 11, 28 of Montanists and Artemonites, cf. *Didache* 11, 12, 13.

use, namely, the good of his diocese. It is of interest to note that the diocesan clergy and laity recently rejected unanimously the proposal that the Bishop of Worcester should give up Hartlebury Castle. Large episcopal incomes, if they are spent in the service of the Church, need not conflict with democratic ideals.

Whilst our author shews no desire to re-distribute the bishops' incomes, he is yet insistent on a re-division of their time. In the early Church there was a three-fold division of the bishop's funds. Dr. Headlam would insist on a three-fold division of the bishop's working hours, one-third to his Diocesan affairs, one-third to the affairs of the whole Church and Nation, one-third to reading and study.

Dr. Headlam doubts whether such a scheme of self-government by the Church, as the Archbishops' Report suggests, will be realised, and further doubts whether it is desired by the majority of Churchmen, but of this he is quite certain: that for such a scheme of Church financial reform as he proposes, direct appeal must be made to Parliament, for the Church, even if self-governing, has neither the strength nor courage herself to carry it through.

His final appeal to our authorities applies not only to financial reform, but to all the other Church reforms we so urgently require.

> "What I do urge is that those who are in authority in the Church should approach this question in a wide and comprehensive spirit; that they should try and work out a scheme for making the Church from this point of view efficient for the work it has to do; that they should show enterprise and broad-mindedness in doing it, and then determination in getting such a scheme carried. There is no doubt that there is a growing feeling that the leaders of the Church have not the courage or the will to carry out a strong and wide scheme in many directions. There is a good deal of impatience, sometimes reasonable, sometimes unreasonable. But I certainly believe that we want in the future, not only the wisdom, which sometimes seems paralyzing, but the will and determination to carry things through."

HOW TO STUDY RELIGION TO-DAY.

"The proper study of mankind is man" is an ancient maxim, but it is still valid. Man, however, is many-sided. He is a microcosm—an epitome of the universe. He reflects in himself the whole creative process. There are three main ways of studying him. He may be studied as a physico-chemical mechanism, or as a biological organism, or as a psychological being. If we study him as a physico-chemical mechanism, we observe all those laws of chemistry and physics operating in him which we observe operating in the most distant planets. If we study him as a biological organism, we perceive that he is subject to the same laws as we observe operating in plants and in the lowliest animal organisms. If we study him as a psychological being, we find that he is possessed of personality, the power to will, to think, to feel; he has memory and imagination, moral consciousness and aesthetic feeling, reasoning power and religious emotion. It is the possession of personality which constitutes him a man, and personality is the great central fact of the universe, for it is the highest product of the evolutionary process. But personality is not superior to the reign of law. Certain ascertainable sequences take place in this most complex region of the human consciousness. It is the study of them which constitutes the science of human psychology.

Now it is becoming more and more a matter of agreement among students of religion to-day that the most important way in which to study religion, and to teach religion, is in its relation to psychology. As it is possible to study man in various ways, so is it possible to study religion in various ways. We may examine and describe and compare and catalogue religion's rituals, organisations, liturgies, creeds, its sacred places, persons, seasons, books, viewed as external or historical facts. But if we study religion in this way, we

study less than half of it. We are still in the outer court of the temple of religion. To enter the sanctuary, we must study all these things in relation to the human personality. Pascal said: "It is in the soul that things happen." Another great religious personality wrote:—

> "I retire from the things without to the things within; I rise from the things within to the things above."

It is in the human soul that religions have their birth, although their ultimate destiny be the realisation of the Divine Nature. Every great religion is the apotheosis of a human personality. No religion, therefore, can be understood apart from human personality, for religion springs from it. Religious creeds, religious rites, religious symbols, mean something to it, do something for it. What exactly is it that they mean and do in each case?

The origin, growth, and functions of religion being all connected with that deep, mysterious thing, the soul of man, the student of religion must begin his study of religion by studying the human soul. When the student knows what that soul is, how it develops, what it desires, what it fears, what it suffers, what it enjoys, what it hopes, what it remembers, he will be in the way to understand Religion; he will also be able to judge of Religion's significance and value. Obviously it is no easy subject to investigate, but it touches the heart of things.

> "To search through all I felt or saw,
> The springs of life, the depths of awe,
> And read the law—within the law."

This is the purpose of the psychology of religion.

Books of religious experience are as old as the *Psalter*, and the *Confessions* of St. Augustine, but the psychology of religion as a science is a child of the twentieth century. It may be said to have taken definite form with the publication of Professor Starbuck's *Psychology of Religion*[1] in 1900. In that book the author reveals the scope of his subject.

[1] Professor Starbuck had published articles on the subject some years previously, but his book published in the Contemporary Science Series is, we believe, the first text-book published on the subject.

> "The study of religion is to-day where astronomy and chemistry were four centuries ago. The world has been taken away from the oracle, alchemist, astrologer, and petty gods, and given over to the control of law. Another four hundred years may restore to law the soul of man, with all its hopes, aspirations and yearnings" (p. 3).

The psychological study of religion, especially in contrast with the dogmatic method, has many advantages. First, its method being the scientific or inductive method is attractive to the modern mind. That method has led to most remarkable discoveries, and it carries with it an authority for the modern man that no other method possesses. The man who is invited to study religion in this way is invited to study it in a way which seems to him the most promising method of studying it.

Another advantage of studying religion in this way is that it will in time break down the disastrous conflict between Science and Religion, which exists in the minds of so many dogmatic Christians and sectarian scientists. As Professor William James explained:—

> "Rightly interpreted, the whole tendency of Dr. Starbuck's patient labour is to bring compromise and conciliation into the long-standing feud of Science and Religion. Your evangelical extremist will have it that conversion is an absolutely supernatural event, with nothing cognate to it in ordinary psychology. Your 'scientist' sectary, on the other hand, sees nothing in it but hysterics and emotionalism, an absolutely pernicious pathological disturbance. For Dr. Starbuck, it is not necessarily either of these things. It may in countless cases be a perfectly normal psychologic crisis, marking the transition from the child's world to the wider world of youth, or from that of youth to that of maturity—a crisis which the evangelical machinery only methodically emphasises, abridges, and regulates" (*op. cit.* p. ix.).

Another advantage of the psychological study of religion lies in the sphere of religious education. Psychology is regarded as a needful study for every modern educationist. It is not less, but even more, needful for the religious educationist. As Starbuck writes:—

> "It will become a common-place to say that a religious teacher cannot stand between a hungering soul and its future self, or between men and God, who does not know at every step something of where the life is, whither it is tending, and the means by which it is to attain its end. That the soul be no longer left to drift aimlessly, and to select

> chance objects for its expression, or remain without an object, is partially to be the work of the psychology of religion" (p. 9).

Another advantage of the psychological method will be to deepen our power of appreciating spiritual things. The hard dogmatic view of religion, the constant source of the *odium theologicum*, will be replaced by an attitude which is more sensitive, sympathetic, and appreciative; one that promises progress, many-sidedness, and vitality in our religious views; one in which the *either-or*, fact or fiction, true or false attitude, towards religious problems, will be replaced by deeper and higher views, in which antitheses are reconciled or eliminated.

We have often observed that one source of religious scepticism to-day is due to the teaching of dogmatic theology dogmatically. Such teaching makes the Christian Faith seem thin and unreal to the modern mind. "The *probabo, probabo*, of a Trinity Sunday sermon," to use Dean Swift's phrase, can, especially in conjunction with the recitation of the *Quicunque Vult*, produce a profound disbelief in Christian theology—a disbelief which can only be overcome by the psychological presentation of the Christian Religion.

Archbishop Temple's great saying has been often quoted of late, and it cannot be quoted too often:—

> "Our theology has been cast in a scholastic mould. We are in need of, and are being gradually forced into, a theology based on psychology. The transition, I fear, will not be without much pain; but nothing can prevent it."

It was the conviction of the profound truth of this utterance which moved the Committee of the Modern Churchmen's Conference to be held at Girton College, Cambridge, August 5—12, this year, to select as their subject for study and discussion the Psychology of Religious Experience. The subject is a vast one, the whole of a studious life-time might be spent in investigating it, and yet much would remain to be explored. No effort will be made at the Conference to treat every side of the subject. The themes to be dealt with will

include the psychology of sin, repentance, forgiveness, conversion, saintliness, inspiration, and the Christian motive; the psychological value of Christian worship and fellowship; the characteristic experiences of youth and age; the witness of the heart to Christ. The President will speak on the psychological basis of religion, and two competent teachers will deal with the difficult theme of the validity of the argument from religious experience. The daily chapel addresses will in each case treat of some great religious personality, whose life will illustrate some particular aspect of religious experience.

We believe that by trying to present the theme in this way all the conference members will get some teaching that will be of value; the philosophical and intellectual will get their portion; the practical and moral theirs; the devotional and mystical theirs. What St. Augustine said of Holy Scripture, will, we hope, be true of our Conference papers and discourses. There will be in them pools of which lambs may drink, and depths in which elephants must swim.

The supreme purpose of the Conference is to impress upon our growing society that the most valuable way of approaching or studying the Christian religion to-day, is psychologically. It yields values to its student there, that it does not yield on the dogmatic side, nor even on the historical--although Bishop Lightfoot recommended the study of Church History to Christians as the cordial for fainting faith and drooping spirits.

We have no intention of anticipating in this article the teaching of the Conference. The modern traveller knows that the way to obtain full educational value from foreign travel is to prepare beforehand by serious study—historical, literary, linguistic, and so on. We are sure that, for a large number of our Conference members, the same is true. No one can know too much about the theme beforehand. Moreover, where all know something of the subject, discussions reach a higher

plane, due to points being made and appreciated, which otherwise are missed or misunderstood.

A number of books dealing with our subject have been written during the last few years, and we propose, in a subsequent issue, to publish a brief notice of a few of them for the guidance of possible students.

DIVORCE: THE QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE.

By Hastings Rashdall, D. Litt., D.C.L., F.B.A.,
Dean of Carlisle.

It is impossible to read the Report of the Divorce Commission or the literature of the Divorce controversy without feeling how inevitably the question demands for its adequate discussion clear views as to the fundamental problems of moral philosophy. It may be freely admitted that in most problems of practical life, men's decisions are not often much affected by their speculative views about moral philosophy. But it is just on such questions as this that philosophical training is most likely to have some influence upon the decision, for it is a matter upon which a right decision must depend in part upon a man's power of distinguishing between mere prejudices of education or environment, and the genuine verdict of the enlightened moral consciousness. The moral philosopher has no more infallible power of making such a distinction than anyone else: moral philosophers do not agree on this subject any more than upon many other questions of practical Ethics. Nevertheless it may safely be asserted that there are certain crudities of view—not only on one side of the controversy—which would be impossible to anyone who had gone through a serious philosophical training, and it is to be regretted that among the witnesses examined by the Commission no lay philosopher was included. It is probable that the examination of a few such

witnesses would have done something to dispel the illusion—shared apparently by some on both sides of the controversy—that a strict view of matrimonial obligations is possible only to those who base their Ethics solely and nakedly upon grounds of religious or ecclesiastical authority, and that an extremely lax view of the subject is the only one which is possible to intelligent and emancipated minds. It is often assumed that we have to choose between a purely "ecclesiastical" or "sacramental" theory of marriage, and a view which is Utilitarian in the sense of pure Hedonism. The possibility of an *ethical* view seems to be ignored.

It could be wished that all the advocates of the ultra-ecclesiastical view had been as candid as Lord Hugh Cecil in admitting that their whole morality rests upon authority.[1] A more philosophical champion of the strictest view would assuredly have endeavoured to show that the verdict of the developed and unsophisticated moral consciousness at least *tends* towards the view that marriage is inherently indissoluble. He would not of course have been bound to show that the objections to Divorce had always been felt, or that they are felt by everyone now. He would not necessarily maintain that the sanctity of marriage had been duly and fully appreciated before the full disclosure of the highest moral ideal in the teaching and the character of Christ, or that any average individual would be likely to arrive at the truth in this matter apart from the influence of Christ's teaching, or that of a society more or less penetrated by His ideal. But he would assuredly have made the most of approximations to the stricter view in pre-Christian and non-Christian moralities: he would have tried to exhibit it as the logical and reasonable development of principles already and independently accepted. At all events he would have insisted that the commands of Christ, once delivered, do embody an ideal which appeals to the highest moral consciousness of the present. Nothing of the kind is attempted in Lord

[1] *Divorce and the Church* (pamphlet) published by the Divorce Law Reform Union.

Hugh Cecil's controversy with Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, nor, I am bound to say, by most of the controversialists upon that side. I do not observe that the word conscience occurs in his contribution to the joint pamphlet. I do not know that I can prove that Lord Hugh loves his neighbour solely because Christ has commanded him to do so, and that he has satisfied himself—presumably by the historical evidence of miracles—that Christ is God, nor do his words necessarily imply that he would equally be prepared to hate his neighbour, had he found such an attitude commanded in the pages of the Gospels: but certainly that is the impression which his language leaves on one's mind. At all events this seems to be quite definitely his view about the whole province of sexual morality. He contends that if Sir Arthur Conan Doyle gives up the indissolubility of the marriage union, he is bound to give up all respect for chastity: there would be no reason why he "should retain belief in such a virtue at all." "Nothing will remain save a vague and irrational prejudice, partly intuitive and partly traditional, but altogether inadequate to restrain natural passion."[2] The reference to an "intuitive" standard might, indeed, suggest some such old-fashioned philosophy as that of the Fathers and the Schoolmen and the Anglican Divines like Bishop Butler who believed in a morality which is discernible by conscience, and a conscience which can be identified with reason; but no such interpretation is possible in view of the preceding statement that that "prejudice" would be "irrational." It is truly distressing to find that a prominent champion of our Neo-Catholicism bases his whole case upon a moral system which can find no more respectable champion among accredited Anglican Divines than the eighteenth century Theological Utilitarian, Archdeacon Paley.

It is obviously impossible for me here to discuss the fundamental question of Ethics raised by this controversy. I can

[2] This last remark is of course irrelevant. Even Christ's command has not secured universal chastity in Christians, or the universal observance of any other moral law.

only argue the question from the point of view of those who believe that the human mind possesses a power of distinguishing between right and wrong, good and evil. There remains of course for those who admit so much the further question whether the moral law consists of isolated precepts having no relation to one another, the obligation of which is independent of consequences, and of their effect on human life as a whole, or whether all the laws of morality are simply so many means of promoting true human good, and the just distribution thereof. I must be content with saying that in my view the latter view alone is tenable—I may add especially the only view tenable for any one who really believes that "all the commandments are briefly comprehended in this saying, 'thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.'" This, of course, does not involve Hedonism. The "good" is not mere pleasure: what is good must be intuitively discerned: it includes a certain type of character which is valuable for its own sake: it includes the cultivation of our highest intellectual and aesthetic capacities, and perhaps many other things besides pleasure. Pleasure is part of the good, but not the whole, and pleasure is not to be estimated by a merely quantitative standard. It is quite open to the holders of such a view to maintain that some pleasures are positively bad.

The importance of the distinction between the ordinary Benthamite Hedonism, and what I have called "Ideal Utilitarianism" is, I may remark, quite inadequately recognized by Lord Hugh's antagonist, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, and by many other controversalists on that side: and it is only a Utilitarianism of this ideal kind which can be identified with the moral teaching of Christ.

If the first of these views—the "purely intuitive" view of morality—is taken, it would be quite open to the champions of "inherent indissolubility" to maintain that the developed conscience condemns divorce under all circumstances. Such a contention would be difficult, in view of the fact (much

insisted upon by its advocates) that such a principle has hardly been recognised outside the Christian Church,[3] while even within it those who maintain that view have generally defended it on grounds of pure authority. No such attempt to defend the prohibition of Divorce on grounds of intuitional morality is made by Lord Hugh Cecil. Nor is it clear that he would adopt the other quite possible line, and contend that all divorce is either inherently bad and inconsistent with the true human good, or that it must necessarily lead to bad social consequences. He does not seem disposed even to contend that God (through Christ) has forbidden divorce because He sees it to be bad, though *we* may not have so much insight, or because it is inconsistent with the highest interests of society, though we may not be able to see why it is so. On the contrary, he seems disposed to treat the prohibition of re-marriage as a source of positive pain imposed upon mankind by way of discipline, whether quite arbitrarily or as a preparation for a higher happiness in a future life. But such a view—the view that Divorce is essentially bad, or bad on account of its consequences—might be taken by a philosophical defender of "indissolubility." Indeed, such a view might be taken by those who do not condemn Divorce in all circumstances. It is quite possible to hold that Divorce is always *bad*, and yet that in some cases it is the less of two evils, and that it is right of two evils to choose the less. But in that case we must no longer talk about the "inherent" indissolubility of marriage. The question whether the State should permit marriages to be dissolved, and whether the individual should avail himself of the permission, becomes one of social expediency; and there must be a comparison, in the light of our knowledge of human nature, and of all the experience which is available between the evils involved in Divorce, and the evils involved in separation

[3] The still stricter view which condemns all sexual intercourse has, of course, frequently been held *e.g.*, by Buddhism, though that religion has been compelled, of course, to tolerate marriage in practice for the mass of mankind. There is no true Buddhist but the monk.

without re-marriage. Our solution of the problems must depend upon the answer that we give to the question: "Will any relaxation, and, if so, what relaxation, of the prohibition of Divorce be on the whole conducive to that true social good which consists not merely in a maximum pleasure, but in the development of the highest type of character, of feeling, and of practice in the matter of sexual relations and otherwise?" I cannot argue the matter further in this paper, but will only say that such seems to me to be the true ground of decision.

But is not the question altered, it will be asked, for those who accept the authority of Christ (as all Christians do and must do) in ethical matters? I must not here enter upon any fundamental questions as to the nature of authority in general, and of Christ's authority in particular. The question raises the issue whether our Lord's legislation is to be regarded as the disclosure of fresh ethical truths which could not be discovered or even recognized as truths by the highest of merely human consciences, or whether Christ Himself put forward His commands rather as appeals to conscience, to be obeyed because they are confirmed by the response which they would awaken in the consciences of His hearers, and which they do now meet with in the present moral consciousness of the best men. I can only say that in my opinion this is the right view of the matter. Such a view does not exclude the profoundest reverence for the moral teaching of Christ. Christ Himself always made His appeal to conscience. I believe that Christ's ethical teaching still appeals to conscience, and is confirmed by the highest moral consciousness of humanity: and it is in the appeal which that teaching makes to the universal conscience of mankind that we can discover the most powerful argument for the Church's teaching about His Divinity. But such questions need not be argued here, because on any view of the nature of Christ's "legislation" it is, I believe, impossible to defend the *a priori* prohibition of all Divorce by an appeal to His words.

In the first place there is the difficulty of ascertaining exactly what our Lord did actually say upon the subject. Lord Hugh Cecil (like the Bishop of Oxford) thinks it probable that the words "except for fornication" are a later addition.[4] I wonder whether either the layman or the Bishop would be prepared with equal decision to reject all the reputed sayings of Christ against which exactly the same critical objection can be urged (*i.e.*, that they are additions to the common source found only in St. Matthew), such as the passages about binding and loosing, the command to bring quarrels to be settled by the Church, the resurrection of the bodies of the Saints? But let that be.

I agree that in this matter their "higher criticism" is probably right: but it is difficult for the Christian theologian—the more difficult in proportion to his reverence for ecclesiastical authority—to condemn the rule of the whole Eastern Church on the ground of a "higher criticism," the very idea of which hardly existed before the nineteenth century. Lord Hugh Cecil is reasonable enough to admit that the question is doubtful: that we cannot found a moral rule binding on all humanity for all time upon the probality that the more generally received view as to the relative antiquity of the Gospels is right, and that that which commended itself to Fathers like St. Augustine and to such modern critics as Baur is wrong.

Unlike the Bishop of Oxford, Lord Hugh does not—in this pamphlet at all events—contend that the Eastern Church or the Bishops of the Lambeth Conference have been wrong in

[4] Lord Hugh Cecil remarks that "it is not easy to understand the extreme surprise expressed by the Apostles, according to St. Matthew's account, if the teaching to which they had listened allowed Divorce for adultery. For such teaching about Divorce was quite familiar to Jewish thought." According to the best authorities this is not the case. The only question between the rabbis was whether Divorce by the husband was allowable for mere caprice, or whether it required grave cause, but not necessarily adultery. This was doubtless the question which our Lord's dictum was intended to answer. His reply was "Marriage was divinely intended to be a life-long union." How much or what kind of misconduct of the one party may justify a Divorce was a question upon which He does not enter.

refusing to condemn the re-marriage of the innocent party in a Divorce suit. He argues only against the further extension of grounds for Divorce. And here he rests his case upon the absoluteness of Christ's command. Such an attitude is really more difficult when it is recognised that the original saying of our Lord contained no exception than when it is supposed that it did contain the one exception. Were that exception part of our Lord's words, it might have been argued that, had He been prepared to admit the possibility of other exceptions, He would have mentioned them. But taking the prohibition in its absolute form, it is no more absolute than many other prohibitions which the Christian Church has never taken absolutely or literally: "Swear not at all," "lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth," "resist not the injurious person," "lend to him that asketh," "he that forsaketh not all that he hath, he cannot be My disciple." These commands are quite equally peremptory and exceptionless. Yet the Christian Church has, with much greater unanimity than it has ever shown on any doctrinal point, permitted oaths, fighting, the retention not only of private property but of great wealth, going to law, the imprisonment of criminals. Vainly does Lord Hugh Cecil attempt to discriminate between the two classes of prohibition. In reference to turning the cheek to the smiter or "rewarding a thief," he remarks that "a State which does not require such patience in its citizens only admits that it has not attained to the standard of the Heavenly Kingdom." If Lord Hugh Cecil were contending only that the State cannot enforce such non-resistance or renunciation on the part of all its citizens, he might have something to say for himself: but he does presumably (to judge from his own practice) approve of the retention of private property by individual Christians, of resistance to those who would take it away, and of Christians serving in the army. The State does not attempt to forbid Lord Hugh Cecil giving away all his property, and it could not compel him to fight, even if he were

of military age: it could only make life extremely undesirable if he did not do so. Only the extremest Tolstoyan, or the "spiritual Franciscan," who denied that our Lord possessed property or "dominion" even "in his shoon," could consistently allege that he takes all Christ's absolute prohibitions absolutely. And there are some precepts which have never been taken literally. If the upholder of indissolubility admits that the difference between what was intended to be an absolute and literal prohibition and the precept which merely asserts a principle or an ideal or a general rule subject to exception must be discerned by the reflective moral consciousness of the individual or of the commuuity, that is another matter. Once admit the principle that our Lord's commands require to be interpreted by the moral consciousness, and then we cannot rule out *a priori* the contention that, when adultery has been committed, Divorce followed by re-marriage may be the smaller of two evils, and the same line of thought may be followed by those who urge that this may equally be so in other cases in which the true ideal and the true purposes of marriage have failed to be attained through the misconduct of one of the parties. On this view, the question, for him who acknowledges the supreme authority of Christ's teaching as for him who does not, becomes one of higher or spiritual expediency. The commands of Christ will only be held to constitute an absolute prohibition so far as they really appeal to the moral consciousness of the community or of the individual.

A very few words may be enough by way of reply to those who base their *a priori* objection not so much on the authority of Christ as on the authority of the Church. That Christian people should be found stumping the country with the assertion that "the Christian Church has always condemned Divorce," really amounts to a scandal. Such an assertion must be based either upon sheer ignorance or upon sheer disregard for truth. The fact is that the attitude of the Church in this matter in primitive times was in the last degree uncertain and inconsistent.

Many Christian Fathers, the practice of many Christian Churches, and the legislation of many Christian Emperors permitted Divorce *a vinculo matrimonii*, *i.e.*, the Divorce with liberty to re-marry at least for the innocent party, not only in case of adultery, but on many other grounds. And this uncertain attitude lasted till quite a late period. When one finds an Anglo-Saxon law enacting that, if a man seduced a married woman, he must find the injured husband another wife, it is evident that even the later patristic period had not bequeathed to the Christian Church any definite rule on the subject. It was only very gradually that the Church made up its mind in the West to allow the Divorce *a mensa et toro, i.e.*, judicial separation without liberty to re-marry, and to forbid the Divorce *a vinculo matrimonii*, while the Eastern Church allowed, and allows to this day, a Divorce *a vinculo*, and not for adultery alone. And it is extremely important to note that even the Western Church does not interpret the commands of Christ literally. The man who turns his wife out of the home and refuses to live with her, does literally put her away; the woman who leaves her husband on the ground of cruelty, does leave him whether she marries again or not. It is admitted on all hands that in some circumstances the literal observance of Christ's commands, though never (strictly speaking) impossible, would involve so much individual hardship, and so much injury to society—one might add so much violation of the general spirit of Christ's own moral teaching—that it ought not to be enforced either by the Church or by the State. The further extension of the same principle is—whether looked at in the light of reason, or of any reasonable interpretation of Christ's commands—a matter of the higher social expediency. The question is one which must be argued on its own merits. It is extremely desirable that liberal Churchmen should make up their minds on the subject. For the present I content myself with this brief attempt to formulate the principles on which, as it seems to me, it ought to be determined.

THE OFFICE FOR THE VISITATION OF THE SICK.

By the Rev. A. N. Bax, M.A., Rector of Radstock.

Our Prayer Book is the official presentation of the mind of our branch of the Church. It is not simply a book of Devotions. It has a teaching office. It is meant to build up English Churchmanship, and to lead her sons and daughters to face profitably the elemental facts of life.

Of all the duties that the clergy are called on to perform only one can be said to lie nearer to the heart of Christ than the Visitation of the Sick. Over the soul led back into the way of peace there is joy in Heaven. That must come first, but measured by Christ's care, can any other come second? Yet no duty is more difficult. The hardest fact of which religion has to take account is unmerited suffering. Where should we look for guidance to that Divine Alchemy, which can turn even our suffering into gain, but to the Prayer Book? Yet the service in reality is too exclusively an office of Repentance and Absolution, while it should be the treasury of all that Christ's teaching and the experience of the Saints have garnered through the centuries, of rich, positive, inspiring thought.

Some years ago it fell to me to tabulate the answers returned in a large diocese to a Bishop's Visitation Questions. Among them was the enquiry—Do you use the Office for the Visitation of the Sick? Hardly anyone used the Office as a whole, though some used portions of it. The truth is that the Office is dominated by a thought, congenial to the days of the Tudor absolutism, and natural when the Sarum Manual was compiled, but alien to the feeling of our own times. The King in those days was the type of power, and men's thoughts of God formed themselves on that. God was conceived of as some immensely magnified monarch standing outside the world and dealing out to men the event appropriate to each.

The minister is instructed to exhort the sick person :—

> "Dearly beloved, know this, that Almighty God is the Lord of life and death, and of all things to them pertaining, as youth, strength, health, age, weakness, sickness. Wherefore, whatsoever your sickness is, know you certainly, that it is God's visitation."

The second part of the Exhortation continues in the same vein:—

> "Take therefore in good part the chastisement of the Lord," and bids us "that we should patiently, and with thanksgiving, bear our heavenly Father's correction, whensoever by any manner of adversity it shall please His gracious goodness to visit us."

There are true and beautiful thoughts in the Exhortation, but this is the dominating thought. It is unreal, and like all unreality a positive evil in the service.

It is unreal because our actions are at variance with it. In the pre-scientific days when disease was met by the deprecation of Litanies, the thought was not contradicted by action, but now it is. We fight disease as an enemy upon whom we have declared open war, and many who can speak with authority would say that the only natural form of death, is death from old age. Society is organised to end disease. We carry on our offensive by the investigation of its sources, and of the laws of health, by the preventive work of the health department, by the labour of the doctor, and by the teaching of hygiene. Without suspicion of rebellion against God, we may preach a Crusade against Consumption, and ask for a Royal Commission on Cancer. God has permitted disease, and we may therefore suppose that as a condition it plays, and has played, a part in the making of man. Let me make clear what I mean by the following illustrations.

Mrs. A. is suffering from consumption. The cause is probably the very damp condition of her cottage, due to the defective thatch through which the rain poured. The landlord would do nothing, and the public authority took no action. I cannot say to her, "Know you certainly this is God's visitation." It is true that she is the victim of the outraged laws of health, but the fault was not hers.

George D., aged 7, was thrown down by another boy at school. His spine was injured, and it is said that he will always be a cripple. Can we say to him—"Take therefore in good part the chastisement of the Lord."

Mrs. C. is a victim of nerves. If only we could make her believe that God means her to be well, she would arise and walk. In Christ's day her friends and neighbours would have said that she was possessed of an unclean spirit. Perhaps they would have taken her to Christ, and He would have rebuked it, and she would have gone away well. I am quite certain that He would not have called her ailment God's "fatherly correction."

E. has inherited a wrecked constitution through her father's vicious life. The corruption which has passed into her blood might, were it in its primary manifestation, have been spoken of as penal, but who would dare so to speak of it in its secondary form. Has it really pleased God's gracious goodness to visit her with this? Surely she suffers because it is a condition of man's making that he should realise in joy and sorrow, in disease and health, in prosperity and adversity, that we are all members of one body and indissolubly linked together.

F. has been struck down through his open-eyed devotion to duty, in the face of great risks, which, like a faithful soldier on God's battlefield of life, he cheerfully took to serve the Master's cause. Are we to tell him that it was God's hand that stabbed him?

There is no need to multiply illustrations. We can all test the reality of the theory by facts.

Secondly, the dominating thought of the Office is not, in the truest sense, Scriptural. By Scriptural I do not, of course, mean that the view is not represented in the Bible, but it is not represented in a form that carries any special authority. The Sons of Thunder had good scriptural warrant when they proposed to call down fire from heaven upon the Galilean villages who would not receive Christ, but we know how

summarily their judgment was treated by their Master. What is important is that this leading thought of the Visitation Office is untrue to Christ's example. Jesus spent a great part of His public life in combating disease. He says very little about the philosophy of the subject. Nowhere does He speak of sickness as "God's visitation," or "chastisement," or "fatherly correction." Once, indeed, in St. John's Gospel, the infirmity is penal—"Sin no more, lest a worse thing befall thee." In another case He seems to connect it with sin (Matt. ix. 2), and there it had some penal aspect. He looked on the man sick of the palsy and said—"Son, be of good cheer, thy sins are forgiven." Once He ascribes it to the direct working of the spirit of evil, when He spoke of the daughter of Abraham, whom "Satan had bound, lo, these 18 years." In the Gospel of St. John He twice connects the thought of suffering and the glory of God. Of the man blind from birth, He said—"Neither this man sinned, nor his parents, but that the works of God should be made manifest in him." And of Lazarus—"This sickness is not unto death, but for the glory of God that the Son of God might be glorified thereby." Sickness here is an opportunity of service for God, but we are not justified in describing it as "chastisement," "correction," or "God's visitation."

When we turn to the Epistles it seems no easier to justify the Exhortation. Curiously, little is said about sickness in them. With the well-known passage from St. James, has disappeared from the Service a true emphasis upon the power of the prayer of faith, but belief in its efficacy has certainly grown in recent years. St. Paul's testimony won through the experience of the thorn in the flesh, is not drawn on, but a really extraordinary omission is that of the beautiful words of the same writer: "For all things work together for good to them who love God"—words so rich in inspiration that it seems incredible that they should not be directly quoted. They ought to be the key words of the Office. I cannot think that the choice of the

passage from the Epistle to the Hebrews for inclusion in the Exhortation is an altogether happy selection. In the Epistle to the Hebrews it is really a quotation from the book of Proverbs, and is like an erratic boulder out of place in its surroundings, for the writer of the Epistle is contemplating persecution, which was not in the mind of the writer of Proverbs. The application is strange, as though God was the author of the persecution, and the moral jars, for we realize since the days of Christ that love is the true instrument of education. When we resort to chastisement, is it not with a deep sense of failure and humiliation? We cannot forget either that Jesus, though He was in a special sense the Son, never so far as we know, endured the chastening of disease. The very thought seems scarcely congruous.

The fact is that we no longer think of God as the Absolute Monarch dealing out weakness and sickness as chastisements and corrections as Henry VIII. or Nero (probably Emperor when the Epistle to the Hebrews was written) meted out punishments to their subjects. Our conception of God has changed. If He is Almighty, He is self limited.

Christian Theology is familiar with the thought of the self-emptying of Christ at the Incarnation—the humiliation and limitation when the Word was made flesh. We must postulate the same of God at the moment of Creation. Either we must think of Him as the Author of Evil or we must suppose that He limited His power for the sake of the end before Him.

The end was not the creation of a perfect machine, but of free and conscious creatures, who, in so far as they go right, do so because they will, and not because they must, and who are therefore fit for fellowship with Himself. The gifts of consciousness and freedom made inevitable suffering and sin. However much sin has aggravated suffering, it is consciousness and not sin that made suffering possible.

The events of this world are conditions impartial in their incidence. "He maketh His rain to fall on the just and on the

unjust, on the evil and on the good." The possibility of disease, misfortune, suffering, sorrow, and the certainty of death we all have to face, and, with certain qualifications, are the lot of one as of another.

Where then does God make Himself felt? He is the Great Comrade ready at hand, nay rather within each one of us, inexpressibly near to us, ready to reinforce us in our struggle, to share our sorrows, and to assist us to achieve the victory. What Christ in His human body did once at a definite place and time, God through the Spirit is always doing. He is the Comrade, the Great Captain in our fight, the Comforter, the Spirit of Truth that guides. He will give us not exemption from the lot of men, but power to win our victory.

Our afflictions may work for us more and more exceedingly an eternal weight of glory. Through His power we may transcend circumstances, and in our utter weakness triumph. It is not in changing the conditions of the world for us that He helps us but by giving us inward power and grace so that in all these things we may be more than conquerors through Him that loved us. The difference of theory is this. According to the Service of the Visitation of the Sick—God has ordered. According to this other theory—God has permitted—as the only possible condition of His goal which is the creation of a being fit for communion with Himself. The consequence of this theory is that we can attack disease and suffering with undivided minds as an enemy, with the faith that God is by our side and not against us.

The complaint has been made that Christianity has lost the character of warfare, though in baptism we are enrolled to be Christ's faithful soldiers. Let us extend the thought of our Christian calling, and conceive of God as our General, the world as the scene of His campaign, ourselves as called to be His fellow labourers and soldiers, and man glorified and the city of God as the goal of final victory. It places us in a position, which is far truer in its suggestion than the Office for the

Visitation of the Sick. We, like those who go to France, are sent by our General to a place, where suffering may likely enough await us by the act of an enemy, by carelessness or wrong or ignorance on the part of ourselves or our friends. But our soldiers do not represent their wounds as inflicted by their General, though he has placed them, where hardship and suffering—perhaps in extreme forms, may await them. His purpose is the redemption of the body of which they are members, as is God's. With this far-off end in view, suffering if it comes, may be welcomed as part of our service. Then indeed through suffering we are made like unto Christ, and however unmerited it may appear, we can bear our witness through it. The conception of sickness as a vocation is a beautiful one. It is indeed a time when we have something to do for God, but this belief is in no way dependent on the conviction that sickness is "God's chastisement," "visitation," or "correction." God is, I believe, suffering with those who suffer in this world, and we may smile in our sufferings as we think of that, as our soldiers may sometimes smile even in the operating tent, when they think of the cause in which they are spent, and the heart of their country bleeding with them.

The Office requires thorough re-consideration. It has been before the Upper House of the Convocation of Canterbury, and in their report they recommend that in the second portion of the Exhortation for "as St. Paul saith," read "as it is written." Verily *parturiunt montes nascetur ridiculus mus.*

Let me in conclusion enumerate the points on which the service should dwell,—on some of which it does of course dwell.

The problem is partly to win spiritual gain for ourselves through the experience of suffering and sorrow, partly to demonstrate to others the power of God to help those who love Him and seek His help in those bitter times.

In the first place the Service should be toned for use on normal occasions of sickness, and the possibility of death should therefore not be too much obtruded. The Service as it stands

is apt to frighten people. But beyond that it should be written so as to lend itself for study as a Service of preparation for Sickness. When we are actually ill we are often too weak to follow new thoughts, but if the thoughts are already firmly lodged in our minds we may be thrown back on them to our great profit. The Service should be adapted for study in schools and Bible classes, as partof our preparation to face life's experiences.

Secondly, the essential lesson to enforce is that "All things work together for good to them that love God." In other words, if we love God, evil may be transmuted. This is the Divine Alchemy. We cannot insist too strongly on it. In the hour of sickness and suffering we may reap the positive bracing effect of struggle. Sickness may purify, may detach from earth, may quicken our sense of dependence on God, may open spiritual vision. On the practical side some of these things may well obtain expression, as the Service suggests, in repentance and amendment of life, in the renewal of the state of charity with estranged neighbours, in doing right by our creditors and dependents. But the Service must not omit to remind that sickness is a call to serve God, by making His power known, as Christ did on the Cross, when circumstances seemed to exclude God, or to make men doubt His presence. The witness of the sick bed is a persuasive sermon. We want to preach the power of God to enable men to rise above circumstances.

Thirdly, the Service should lay stress on our conduct in sickness,—especially on the duty of being unselfish to those who nurse, on cheerfulness, on not worrying.

Fourthly, it should impress on people the value of the therapeutic or health-giving power of prayer.

Fifthly, it should set death in its true perspective, and not dwell simply on its more sombre side. Death is just as natural as birth. Like birth, it is entrance into a new life, and though we may all be reluctant to leave the scene of our familiar earthly duties and friends, especially if some we love are still dependent on us, still from death itself we should not shrink.

Sixthly, it should dwell on the comfort of the thought of the universal Presence of God here and hereafter. Death cannot part us from God. In staying or going hence, He is equally with us, or rather, we may hope that on the other side we may be far more conscious of His presence. There is comfort too in the thought that, if we are withdrawn from those we love, and to whom our presence seems so necessary, yet God will use other means for their benefit.

Lastly, we must re-think God. He has permitted sickness and suffering for reasons we may partly guess, but He is on man's side to help him to triumph over them, and, if it may be, to end them.

> "I heard a great voice out of the throne saying, Behold, the tabernacle of God is with men, and He shall dwell with them, and they shall be His people, and God Himself shall be with them and be their God; and He shall wipe away every tear from their eyes, and death shall be no more, neither shall there be mourning, nor crying, nor pain any more, for the first things are passed away."

REVIEWS.

EVOLUTION IN CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.*

This is the best Primer of, or Handbook to, Modernism—a term to which even the writer's authority fails to reconcile us—that has yet appeared. An ideal S.P.C.K. would reproduce it in a popular form, and at a nominal price; for it tells people in precise but perfectly plain language exactly what the new tendencies in religion and theology, which are being so much discussed, are. M. Jourdain, in *Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme*, found, to his surprise, that he had been talking prose all his life without knowing it. Not a few of Professor Gardner's readers will find that they have been Modernists without knowing it, if not all their lives, at least since they began to think about religion; for what is called Modernism is religion as it appears, and appears necessarily, to the modern man.

**Evolution in Christian Doctrine*, by Professor Percy Gardner, Litt. D., F.B.A. Crown Theological Library. Williams & Norgate, 1918. 5/-.

The title recalls Newman's *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine.* But this famous book was written with a controversial purpose, and from a controversial standpoint: and this, while it secured its immediate success, was fatal to its character as a permanent contribution to thought. A theory cannot be taken up where it suits a writer's purpose, and dropped where it is inconvenient. He must be prepared to follow it out to its conclusions, and go where the argument leads. Again, since Newman wrote (1845) the ground has shifted. The Broad Churchmanship of the time was "largely emotional and common sense, mere generosity of spirit and love of liberty." The Oxford Movement hated and feared liberty: hence the conflict, not even now extinct, between the two. But the foundations of the scientific theology of to-day are far more deeply laid in philosophy and psychology." Modernism

> "is based upon evolution in science and critical method in history; and it demands, not that the great truths of the Christian religion shall be given up, but that they shall be considered afresh in the light of growing knowledge, and restated in a way suitable to the intellectual conditions of the age."

Its note is its inevitableness. It is not so much that traditionalism has been disproved—I do not know that witchcraft or astrology have been disproved—or that it is no longer accepted by persons of education; it is rather that the mental climate has changed to such an extent that it is impossible that the traditional position should now be held. Its very advocates are half-hearted; even for them the irrational elements which are not its essence are, like the shores of Ausonia, *semper cedentia retro.* The argument *e.g.*, from congruity—*i.e.*, that the uniqueness of Jesus demands an environment of miracle—would have seemed an evasion to Paley; the concentration of the wonder-factor in Christianity in the mysterious events which preceded the Birth and accompanied the Resurrection of its Founder, is, in Professor Gardner's words, "a confession of bankruptcy, a payment of a penny in the pound." For,

> "if we try to look at the matter in a broad way, we shall see that for the thaumaturgic and materialist view of Christianity which ruled Europe in the Middle Ages, there were four main doctrinal supports. These were the miraculous birth, the physical resurrection, apostolic succession, and the doctrine of transubstantiation. Though these four came into the Church in various periods, they all belong to one range of ideas, and fit into one another like the joints of a fishing rod."

The Reformed Churches no longer accept the two last beliefs; but what is more important than this is, that the "range of ideas" to which all four belong has been left behind by the modern mind. If this range of ideas is part and parcel of Christianity, this attitude of the modern mind is, no doubt, unchristological, and must be treated as a symptom of disease. The Roman Catholic Church, which has the courage of its opinion, treats it in this way; and imposes the Thomist-Aristotelian form of scholasticism, both in philosophy and theology, on its adherents. It is magnificent; but it is not war. The undignified kicking against the pricks that is characteristic of

our Anglican Ultramontanism is neither war nor magnificent. The Papac
though it has ceased to be a factor in European thought, is, and will be f
long, a factor in European society.

Denominational Anglicanism is as negligible a quantity in English life
it is in the English mind.

Of the Church of England, Professor Gardner tells us truly that

> "the proletariate of the great cities is precisely the element that has t
> least sympathy with her. She has looked on while the working peop
> have drifted away from her. That she can ever recall them to l
> communion is doubtful. Bnt what is quite certain is that her on
> chance of again attracting them lies in a complete change in her wa
> her organization, and her teaching."

The National Mission was an attempt to recover lost ground on this sid
The result was less than had been hoped by its promoters: there was mu
activity in what are known as "Church circles;" but the nation w
unmoved. One, and perhaps not the least important, cause of the co
parative failure of the effort, was its deliberate ignoring of the intellectu
problems which stare people, even very ordinary people, who take religi
seriously, in the face. For the intellect, if it is not the soul, is the backbo
of piety: and of the rational factors in religion it may be said that "exce
these abide in the ship, ye cannot be saved." The most urgent need of
English Church is "a great raising of the intellectual standard of her cler
Those who are well acquainted with the theological colleges deplore the l
standard of intelligence there allowed." The difference between Scotla
and England in this respect is great: few Scottish village congregati
would tolerate the preaching that satisfies a fashionable London chur
This is why the Church is a more important factor of the national life
Scotland than in England: why her services are better attended, and
clergy, at least intellectually, more influential. For, "unless religion satis
the mind as well as the heart, a painful clashing occurs, which destroy
clergyman's power for good." The recent Hereford controversy is
example. That the bishops who lent themselves to this agitation h
emerged with damaged credit matters little; what matters is that th
discredit is taken to reflect upon the institution which they represent; t
the Church will be held to be the worse for wear. Without reason, it m
be. But "*tu l'as voulu Georges Dandin*:" religion has been wounded in
house of its, at least nominal, friends.

The most eminent of continental Modernists, M. Loisy, now Professo
Comparative Religion at the Collége de France, tells us the movement
not in the first instance, or primarily, philosophical, but historical. Wha
urged was that things did not happen as tradition described them as hav
happened: this was why, when the Roman Church imposed the traditic
account as binding *de fide*, the breach came. This is so: and, in view of
constructive charges brought by the Encyclical *Pascendi*, it was necess
that it should be made clear. But an at least implicit theory of knowle
underlies the simplest statement of fact: and, from this standpoint,
prophetic words of Archbishop Temple, written in 1857, which Profe

Gardner takes as the motto of this very able book, may be regarded as the key to Modernism.

> "Our theology has been cast in the scholastic mode, *i.e.*, all based on Logic. We are in need of, and we are being gradually forced into, a theology based on psychology. The transition, I fear, will not be without much pain; but nothing can prevent it."

In other words, when we consider the religious beliefs of the past, we must not ask, Are these things so? or, Did these events happen as they are said to have happened? We must rather ask, How did people come to think that these things were so? or that these events happened in this way? Not till these questions have been answered can the question of fact be approached, or even, dimly, seen.

> "In the ancient world there was no rigid barrier between mythology and history; the two passed one into the other by imperceptible gradations. The question which our children now put to us—Did it happen?—was not a question which much disturbed the minds of Greeks or Jews. A tale with a good moral was accepted for the sake of its moral,—and no very serious attempt was made to fit it into a framework of geography and chronology. . . This fact lies at the root of a vast deal of difficulty for modern Christianity."

With these wise words, which the reader must apply for himself, we may leave these grave questions, which must be met, not evaded, by the apologetic of our time.

A. Fawkes.

IF A MAN DIE?*

The subject with which this book deals is one which has always occupied the mind of man, and never more so, perhaps, than at the present time, when Death is more than ordinarily busy reaping his harvest among the civilized races of the world. Day by day the flower of our manhood are, to use their own expression—unconsciously borrowed from primitive mythology—"passing West," and those who are left behind to mourn are above all things anxious to have some assurance, more definite than anything they have been able to attain by the mere repetition of the words of the Creed, that this life is not all, but that there is an immortal life beyond the grave. What is there, then, over and above a revelation which seems to have largely lost its power to be a living source of comfort to help distressed souls in such a time as this? That is the question which the writers of this book set themselves to try and answer.

Immortality: An Essay in Discovery co-ordinating Scientific, Psychical, and Biblical Research. Edited by Canon B. H. Streeter. London: Macmillan & Co., 10/6 net.

In his Gifford Lectures on the belief in Immortality among the primit peoples of mankind, Sir J. G. Frazer comes to a conclusion which is evid not only from a study of such peoples as they exist to-day, *e.g.*, the nati of Australia, New Guinea, and Melanesia, beyond which his studies do go at present, though as a matter of fact it is universally true, and may deduced from a study of the rites of burial and the cave-drawings of Aurignacian and Magdalenian peoples of prehistoric times, viz., that "it impossible not to be struck by the strength, and perhaps we may say universality, of the natural belief in immortality among the savage races mankind. With them a life after death is not a matter of speculation a conjecture, of hope and fear; it is a practical certainty which the individ as little dreams of doubting as he doubts the reality of his conscious exister The belief influences his attitude towards the higher powers, the cond of his daily life, and his behaviour towards his fellows; more than that regulates to a great extent the relation of independent communities to e other." He goes on to show how this belief has been the fruitful source wars and persecutions, and of heavy economic losses in sacrifices to dead, and continues: "It is not for me to estimate the extent and gravit the consequences, moral, social, political, and economic, which flow dire from the belief in immortality." But, as applying to ourselves, he point two opposing estimates which men have formed of themselves and th species: "On the one hand there are those who love to dwell on the grand and dignity of man—surely, they say, such a glorious creature was not b for mortality, to fade like a flower and pass away like a breath; and, on other hand, are those who remind us how weak, how ignorant, how sh lived is the individual, how stained by folly and crime is man's history, h insignificant in the universe is the earth which he inhabits, and they a Shall a creature so puny and frail claim to live for ever?" And he conclud "I do not presume to adopt the one view or the other, it is enough for m have laid a few of the facts before you, I leave you to draw your o conclusions."

So we ask, and Canon Streeter's book essays to give an answer, Are th any grounds in reason combined with revelation for confirming the in belief of primitive man supported by all the aspirations of his civil successors in "a life in" a "world to come?"

In the first essay Mr. Clutton-Brock deals with Pre-suppositions and judgments. He starts with the fact that many at the present time pro agnosticism on the subject, and yet he shows that this attitude is re impossible; we cannot escape from a working hypothesis that life doe does not end with death, and this must, one would suppose, affect our conc And yet it is not so. Unbelievers in a future life believe just as firml absolute values, in truth, in righteousness, and in beauty, as the man believes in a future life, and in fact we may find here the cause of m avowed disbelief; it is really faith, a faith in absolute values, which ref the support of any dogma; it is the supreme example of man's passion disinterestedness, the last asceticism of which man in his passion for abso values is capable. So this asceticism is a kind of self-denial, for we ca

trust ourselves not to frame dogmas that will pervert our absolute values. Among other reasons for disbelief Mr. Clutton-Brock mentions "the strange assertion, commonly associated with the Christian faith, that animals have no souls; this did not matter so long as men saw no likeness between themselves and animals, but now the contention is obvious that, since animals have no souls, men can have none either, and must die like dogs. But how if dogs die like men? Perhaps the last piece of Christian humility we have to learn is to believe, with St. Francis, that the black beetle is our brother." In his beliefs in a future state, a God, a universe, man is always trying to express his absolute values, and the values are permanent; they are always seeking expression in a desire to love something for its own sake, and not for any advantage it may bring; no mere comforting belief will satisfy it. The God who has been revealed to him does not satisfy his values; will he give up God or the values? This conflict rages through all religious history, and nowhere is it fiercer than in the matter of beliefs about a future life. Without a future life there seems to be no justice, no significance in pain and grief, for these are a matter of the treatment of individuals, and if the individual does not survive, our values are distorted. And then there is the belief in Hell, and the mind of man has been burnt by the fires of his own imagined Hell; and so men turn away from all belief in a future state lest it should lead to fanaticism. Yet the supreme question is: Is matter the master of what we call spirit, or spirit the master of what we call matter? If life is to be defined as a mechanical process, our very values are illusions; we are imprisoned within the illusion of life, and yet the fact that we can call it an illusion proves that we are not perfectly imprisoned; the mechanical process is capable of knowing that it is one, and at once it ceases to be a machine to itself. Therefore men will continue to believe in a future life, will indeed believe in it more and more with every increase of consciousness.

Mr. Clutton-Brock having thus disposed of the preliminary *pros* and *cons* we come to that which may, perhaps, without detriment to the others be considered the most valuable essay in the book—Dr. Hadfield's discussion of the Mind and the Brain from the standpoint of Science. After rejecting the materialistic and idealistic theories of the relation of Body and Mind, Dr. Hadfield takes as his starting-point the theory of "Psycho-physical interaction," and sets out to determine which of these, the Body or the Mind, is the dominating factor in our lives. By a masterly process of induction, dealing with the influence of the mind on the brain and nervous system, ranging over all the phenomena connected with hypnotism,—which he defines as being so far from a condition of sleep as to be in reality a state of heightened attention, a state of abstraction from the world produced by devoting the whole attention to one idea,—auto-suggestion and trance, neurasthenia, shell-shock, Christian Science, so-called,—of which he believes there is sufficient evidence to show that physical symptoms have been cured by psychical causes,—and telepathy, he concludes that there is abundance of evidence to demonstrate the mastery of the mind over the body; and thus he is led to the study of the biological development of the mind in the individual and the race. In the individual he shows how, for example, in

the child sensory stimuli are necessary, *e.g.*, to sight; but this does not remain so; later on there supervenes the faculty of the inner sight which we call imagination, and we have the genius of the artist, the poet, the philosopher. The same thing is true of the emotions: as Darwin showed in his book on the *Expression of the Emotions*, the scowl of anger is the vestige of the setting of the brow assumed by an animal before charging a foe, the sneer which exhibits the canine teeth is all that remains of the threat of the wolf to devour; but now we scowl because we are angry, we sneer to show our contempt, and so on: the mind initiates the movements and uses them as modes of expression; so likewise in the race: there is what may be called a "cosmic mind," which develops through all living things from the amoeba onwards, becoming ever more and more differentiated, until it arrives at distinct personality in the higher animals and man, in whom we find not only Consciousness but Will, and here we have phenomena which the laws of Physiology entirely fail to explain, for in the will, as in consciousness, we have a new element in the evolution of life, a force, which can dominate brain processes. Thus, though the evidence brought forward does not amount to proof that the mind survives the destruction of the body, yet it is only reasonable to assume that the process which has been at work during the whole of biological history will be continued to its logical conclusion, and though, so far as science is concerned, life after the grave is not a proved fact, the evidence is sufficient to justify faith in it. Such faith is not credulity: for "Faith" is merely the religious counterpart of the "hypothesis" of the scientist. "We may conclude, then, that before our lives began we were each parts of the world soul without separate consciousness, and without distinct individuality, that our lives were offspring of the universal life, and that by interaction with other lives, with other things and with God, we are capable of developing souls free and undetermined, and capable of immortal life."

Canon Streeter's own two essays deal with "the Resurrection of the Dead," and the "Life of the World to come." In the first he takes the intuitions of great men, and especially our Lord's declaration of God as Father, or rather, perhaps, we should say, Parent, and Artist, as the foundation of his argument: a loving father or mother take pride in their children, and cannot bear to think they should miss the object of their being; an artist takes pride in his work, and though he may be sadly conscious how far short he falls of attaining his ideals, will not willingly allow the work of his brain and hands to perish: can we think less of God? The argument may go further than man and apply to animals—but why not? Many dogs are more worthy of immortality than their masters, *e.g.*, think of Bill Sykes and his dog! But the crude idea of what is called the resurrection of the body is derived from apocalyptic, and was devised to meet the notion of a shadowy life in Hades which the Sadducees shared with the writers of the Old Testament and the Greeks, and indeed with primitive man. Rather must we lay hold of St. Paul's idea of the "spiritual body" to clothe the immortal part of us, and this "spiritual body" we are each one fashioning during our earthly life; no part of the materials of our earthly

bodies form part of our future inheritance, but our spirits enter the unseen not unclothed, but clothed upon. As to Canon Streeter's idea that Time and Space belong not only here and now, but are necessary to our future experiences, and his picture of the journeying from star to star of our immortal beings—this may be left in the region of the undetermined; as may also his thought that judgment takes place for each individual at death: the New Testament certainly speaks of a "Judgment Day" when "the thoughts of all hearts shall be revealed," and to speculate too far on such mysteries is not wise. The Canon's second essay deals with what we may picture to ourselves as the conditions of life in the next world, and it is a sufficiently pleasing and attractive one: we like his notion that just as the faculty of "Humour" was not absent from the character of the Master, as many passages in the Gospels show, so it will not be absent from heaven, and will form the salt of society there as it does here. Mr. Clutton-Brock's second essay, entitled *A Dream of Heaven*, is much on the same lines, though it strikes us as somewhat too lightly painted for such a serious subject; we like his comparison of the myths of the future blessed state, Valhalla, Dante's Paradise and the Visions of the Apocalypses to music, *i.e.*, as having the same relation to reality that music has: "Heaven is music," Campion says, but it does not mean an eternal twanging of harps nor singing of hymns: but the expression of a freer life than man can ever know here: in music, as in all art, the more completely it is art, there is the sense of heaven, whether it be a triumphant prophecy of it or an aching desire for it. What men wish and passionately long for is not a heaven of idleness, but rather for a business freed from the struggle for life, and all the more intense for that reason. We carry our characters with us, and God loves us for what we are, but progress there as here means becoming freer of the tyranny of the past, not developing into something different. The process may be painful; one may call it purgatory, but the word contains a latent error becouse it is not so much purging we need as enriching; the pain of it will be real "like the Crucifixion, which continues for ever, and must continue, until man has risen to an equality with God; but that time is hidden in the darkness of the future, for it rests with man himself whether he shall so rise. But all the beauty and glory of the universe is in the desire of God for man, and this also is the beauty and glory of heaven, more intense than on earth because there man is closer to God."

Mr. Emmet's essay deals with the subject of the Bible and Hell, and is a carefully reasoned article. Like Mr. Clutton-Brock, he attributes much of the latent and of the openly-expressed disbelief in immortality to a revolt on the part of educated people from the crude doctrine of hell, in which the less educated portion of mankind appears to revel, and which forms the stock-in-trade, so to say, of the larger part of evangelistic and Salvation Army preaching. "Our strongest ground for the belief in immortality," he well says, "is our trust in the infinite love of God and our conviction that in His Universe goodness must ultimately prevail; but the doctrine that through all eternity there will continue to exist individuals suffering acutely in useless and hopeless agony, is too cruel and too irrational to be compatible

with that belief." But when we look into its origin and development we soon find that in that crude form it is a part of our heritage from primitive ideas, coupled with suggestions which may be gathered from the Old Testament, whose writers shared in that heritage, and from additions which were made by the apocryphal and apocalyptic writers, these were handed on to the writers of the New Testament, or rather, at least, expressed by some, not all, of them.

The notion of a fixed place of punishment, and that everlasting, just as of a fixed place of happiness in the presence of God, derives originally from the geocentric theory of the universe; in this the earth is at the centre, above it is the heaven in which dwells God with all His hosts of angels, and below, or in the depths of the earth, is the Unseen World to which depart the souls of the dead; in fact, as it has been well put, the universe is conceived of as a sort of three-storied building with this arrangement; later on the idea was developed that God's servants went to dwell with Him in heaven, while the wicked went to the "underworld," there to receive "the vengeance of eternal fire" with the devil and his angels.

Of course, all such ideas were necessarily modified when the true constitution of the universe was realized, and it became the fashion to speak of "heaven" and "hell" as "states" rather than "places;" and on this Canon Streeter has some good remarks in his second essay.

Mr. Emmet's analysis of the apocryphal and apocalyptic writings is masterly, and deserves careful study; it leads up naturally to what he has to say as to the New Testament; there he finds that the doctrine of future punishment is most prominent in Matthew, 1 and 2 Thessalonians, 2 Peter, Jude, and Revelation, the very books that are recognised as showing most clearly the influence of contemporary apocalyptic ideas; and he argues that what they really teach is rather "a ceasing to be" than any such thing as an eternity of future punishment. In the Pauline Epistles (apart from Thessalonians), on the other hand, we have "very definite hints of a certain type of universalism." Throughout the New Testament there is, doubtlessly, a distinction drawn definitely between two classes, the sheep and the goats; but, with Matthew Arnold, we may believe that we are not debarred from hoping that "the Good Shepherd who seeks for the lost sheep will not rest till He has saved the goats." This is all, no doubt, highly controversial; it will appeal to those for whom it is specially intended, but we must fear, at the same time, that it will leave superficial readers of the New Testament unconvinced. It may be noted that, although Canon Streeter more than once expresses his entire agreement with Mr. Emmet, he yet says: The real effect of the Judgment will be that we shall all be 'found out,' and this for most of us, will be an acute humiliation; but real self-knowledge, painful as it is, is the first step towards reformation; and to be "despised for what one thinks one's excellence, . . . to be convinced that admiration, respect, and affection are one's due, and to receive the contrary, is to suffer acutely; but it is the suffering, not of Purgatory, but of hell—for it is suffering which is not redemptive but wholly profitless." And he adds: "For the incurably selfish, however, if such there be, there must be an experience of hell, *i.e.*

a period of inevitable but wholly profitless suffering." And further, and this is where he and Mr. Emmet fall into line: "The recognition of this fact does not bind us to suppose that, as a matter of fact, any cases will be found to be ultimately incurable; or that, if so, the hell in which they will have necessarily lived for a time will not ultimately be ended by their annihilation." This is, perhaps, legitimate speculation, and there are some who will find comfort in it; but it is not argument, and there is always the danger of being "wise above what is written!"

We have not left ourselves space to deal adequately with the three closing essays of the book by Miss Dougall, the talented authoress of *Pro Christo et Ecclesia;* these deal in a sympathetic spirit with such questions as Spiritualism, Christian Science, Telepathy, Theosophy, the doctrine of Karma and Re-incarnation, and cognate subjects, and may be compared with what Mr. Edward Clodd, the veteran anthropologist, has to say on the same themes in his recent and striking book: *The Question: If a man die shall he live again?* Needless to say, Miss Dougall writes with knowledge and insight, but to our mind she allows too much weight to the phenomena of Spiritualism, and her evident bias needs to be tempered with the calm scientific investigations of Dr. Hadfield; it may indeed be hoped that in any future book on "Immortality" it may not be thought necessary to devote so much attention to matters which, from the Christian point of view, are largely irrelevant to the subject; with this criticism one may agree with her conclusion which focusses the whole argument to which the book has been leading up: "If the ultimate unity is the perfect friendship of all living selves with each other and with God, each individul soul living for this high destiny must become ever more clearly outlined in distinctive personal beauty; and, on the other hand, if the progress of the soul is from selflessness to clearer and clearer definition of personal distinction, the ultimate unity of all in all must be the perfect friendship."

This book supplies a real need, and we thank the writers for their clear exposition of what may be called, for want of a better term, the modern point of view. Immortality is not "proved," but it is shown to be the least unsatisfactory way of regarding the Universe, and the purposes of God concerning it, and, it may be hoped that the argument to this book, so reasonable and yet so hopeful, will be a means of inducing those who are inclined to take up an agnostic position in the matter, or even to cling to an attitude of disbelief, to re-consider the question, and to re-adjust their values. With this hope we earnestly commend the book to the attention of our readers.

H. J. D. Astley.

CHURCHMEN'S UNION NEWS.

The Council met at the Church House on Wednesday, January 9th.

The Treasurer's report showed a satisfactory balance, and the Secretary's an increase of 33 in the membership of the Union.

The arrangements for the Annual London Meeting were discussed, and the details left to the Chairman and Secretary. In pursuance of this the date has been fixed for Thursday, June 27th, and the Bishop of Carlisle has consented to preach at the service.

The Council then went carefully through the draft Memorandum upon the Archbishops' Report on Church and State. Having made a few amendments, they adopted the Report and ordered it to be printed, copies being sent to the Bishops, to the Press, and to the members of the Committee of the Representative Church Council, which is to discuss the question.

The Committee appointed in June, 1917, to draw up a Memorandum on the position of Women in the Church, reported that they were unable to agree. After two meetings one of their number had sent round a draft Memorandum, and amended it in consequence of criticism, but had failed to produce a document which they could all sign. A suggestion was made that if the Editor thought fit to print the draft it might serve as a basis for discussion in the Union generally.

The Conference Committee reported that the next Conference will be held at Girton College, August 5th-12th, and that the subject chosen is "The Psychology of Religious Experience."

The Publications' Committee reported that Mr. Fawkes' manual had been published, Canon Glazebrook's was ready for issue, and two others were in preparation.

A resolution was passed welcoming the appointment of Dr. Hensley Henson to the Bishopric of Hereford. Copies of this were ordered to be sent to Dr. Henson, the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Prime Minister, and the Press.

The Rev. W. C. Roberts wishes it to be known that he voted alone against the adoption of the Report on Church and State, and that he has since resigned his membership of the Council.

London Branch.—A meeting was held on January 22nd at 19, Hereford Square, by kind invitation of the Rev. C. R. and Mrs. Shaw-Stewart. The Rev. C. J. Sharp read a paper on "Marriage and Divorce." Points in the Majority and Minority Reports, and the position as regards Church and State, were considered and discussed.

The lay members of the branch met on January 4th, by kind invitation of Mr. and Mrs. Mead, at 47, Campden Hill Road, Kensington, when it was

unanimously agreed to support the Lay Section of the C.U., and render all possible assistance to the movement.

Hertfordshire Branch.—A meeting of members and friends was held at "Acrise," St. Albans (by kind invitation of Canon Papillon), on February 5th, when the Rev. W. A. Cunningham Craig gave an interesting address on "The Gospel of a Modern Churchman." A brisk and stimulating discussion ensued.

The branch unanimously passed a resolution urging the Council to adopt a well-considered policy of advertising the Union and its aims, and to raise a special fund for the purpose.

Manchester Branch.—At a meeting held in the Onward Buildings, Deansgate, on Jan. 14th, the Rev. A. J. Humphreys in the chair, the resignation of Professor Canney was received with regret. The Rev. F. E. Hutchinson, Vicar of Leyland, was elected as President of the branch. A vote of confidence in, and congratulation to, the Bishop-elect of Hereford was then proposed by Mr. Hutchinson, seconded by the Rev. H. Edwards, and carried unanimously.

The Rev. T. Bingley Boss, Vicar of Goosnargh, then read a paper, *The Religious Problems of Psychical Research*, dealing with the situation created by what might be regarded as the permanent additions to knowledge made by this study, especially in their bearing on the science of religious psychology. Mr. Boss concluded by pleading for a sympathetic attitude towards the whole subject. An interesting discussion followed.

On Feb. 9th, a meeting was held in the Church House, the Rev. F. E. Hutchinson in the chair, the Dean of Manchester also being present. A paper was read by the Dean of Carlisle upon *Church and Nation*. Dr. Rashdall urged the necessity of a definite theory of the Church, if Liberals were to contest the finality of their opponents' theories upon this subject, in the coming period of controversy. To accept the Aristotelian conception of the State—an institution to promote the true end of man—was to admit of no final cleavage between Church and State, which in a Christian community are fused. Such was the classic view of Hooker, and, later, of Dr. Arnold. The Dean passed on to make certain reservations: *e.g.*, the State was under the necessity of imposing itself upon everybody within a definite area which the Church, as a voluntary society whose *ultima ratio* was not force, could not do. The identity between Church and Nation was indeed only approximate, but nevertheless in a country like England it was sufficient. One was still justified in describing the English nation as Christian, and there was nothing intolerable in the Church being governed by the nation's representatives. After all, the best work of the Church had not been done by Synods, which rarely satisfied that condition of Liberty laid down by Lord Acton—the sanctity of minorities.

Some controversy followed, Canon Edwards Rees pleading for self-government of the Church. A vote of thanks to the Dean was proposed by the Rev. J. A. Lauria, seconded by the Rev. H. Edwards, and passed with enthusiasm.

CORRESPONDENCE.

CHANGING THE CREEDS.

SIR, TO THE EDITOR OF *The Modern Churchman.*

The price of liberty is eternal vigilance. That is my excuse for drawing attention to a matter which may be capable of a quite satisfactory explanation, but which on the face of it is a new inroad from a most astonishing quarter on freedom of opinion. I have seen no comment on it. In his letter to Dr. Henson, the Archbishop of Canterbury sought to elicit from him not only an assurance that he recited certain clauses of the Creed *ex animo*, but *that he had no wish to change them.* Is that to be made a new test of sincerity? How many could pass it with reference to the Athanasian Creed? Are we to be suspect because we even think that the truths of our religion could be more suitably expressed after fifteen centuries? It is, of course, incredible that the Archbishop can mean this.

HENRY LAURENCE.

Bulmer Rectory, York, Feb. 2nd, 1918.

[Like our correspondent we noted the Primate's question, and think it demands serious attention.

We take it that no historical scholar wishes to change any historical document providing the text is correct, least of all if he be a Churchman the historic creeds of the Church. We may confess that we had little sympathy with the well-meant efforts of a body of scholars a few years ago to re-translate the *Quicunque Vult.* Our present translation breathing a spirit of unflinching adherence to the Trinitarian formula, combined with the conviction that there is nothing but everlasting fire for those who deny it, is so true to the thoughts and circumstances of those who composed the *Quicunque Vult* that to translate it so as to obscure this conviction is not to treat the document honestly.

In the case of the Apostles' Creed many are aware that since it first became the Baptismal Creed of the Roman Church it has undergone a number of changes, and that we even have it in two forms in our Prayer Book. Any who will read Dr. Swete's delightful little book on the Apostles' Creed can find there a concise and interesting history of these changes, and the reasons for some of them. Of course the fact that changes have been made in our Nicene Creed is even better known. The addition to the *Filioque* clause, an addition deplored by many English Churchmen to-day, helped to split Christendom. It is equally well known that the original Nicene Creed ended with the words "and in the Holy Ghost," and that it made no mention of the Virgin Birth. Dr. A. E. Burn's excellent *Introduction to the Creeds* may be referred to for other variations from the original Nicene Creed.

A Liberal Churchman might wish to change (1) The *use* of the Creeds, *e.g.*, reserve the Apostles' Creed for recitation at the Baptismal Service, the Nicene Creed for recitation at the Eucharist, and the *Quicunque Vult* for the private study of dogmatic theologians; (2) The *interpretation* of clauses in the

Creeds, *e.g.*, giving to some a symbolical sense which were formerly interpreted historically or literally; (3) The *animus imponentis* of the ordaining bishop in cases where his theological knowledge was extremely limited in amount or antiquated or inaccurate in character; but we take it that no educated Liberal clergyman would wish to change the Creeds except in so far as their present text or the translation of that text is inaccurate.

Of course there are a number of Liberal clergymen who would wish to have a simple modern profession of Christian faith and practice authorised for recitation in our ordinary Church Services as an optional alternative to the Apostles' Creed, or who might even wish to have the ancient baptismal creed of the Church of Jerusalem ("I believe in the Father and in the Son and in the Holy Spirit, and in one baptism of repentance for the remission of sins") substituted for the Creed of the Roman Church at baptisms.

We take it, however, that the Primate does not regard such feelings as either disloyal or heretical, nor would he deny that the Church, as a whole, or the English branch of it, has the right to formulate a new creed, providing such creed contain nothing contrary to the true interpretation of Holy Scripture. What, however, the Primate did mean by the question, we should very much like to know.—ED. *M.C.*]

CHRIST AND DIVORCE.

SIR, *To the Editor of* THE MODERN CHURCHMAN.

I wish to distinguish between marriages in the Church of England, and civil marriages before a registrar.

The vow in the Solemnization of Matrimony is perfectly explicit:—"I take thee to my wedded wife . . . till death us do part, according to God's holy ordinance."

As to its being according to God's holy ordinance the records in St. Mark x. 9-12, and in St. Luke xvi. 18, are quite definite, but an exceptional case is considered in two passages of St. Matthew. The reason is obvious, the gospels of St. Mark and St. Luke were edited for the Latins and the Greeks respectively, neither of these could point to a divinely sanctioned concession about divorce. But St. Matthew, who was writing in Aramaic for the Jews, had formally to cancel the concession of Moses, and probably used the exact words of Christ who spoke in Aramaic.

Let us consider St. Matthew v. 32, first. It is obvious all through the Sermon on the Mount that the law of the Kingdom is stricter than the law of Moses from Sinai, for Christ annuls what Moses was forced to allow:—Moses's "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth" was not a command to exact vengeance, but a limitation of vengeance.

> "It hath been said, whosoever shall put away his wife, let him give her a writing of divorcement: but I say unto you, that whosoever shall put away his wife *παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας* causeth her to commit adultery" (v. 31-32).

Had the Greek translator of St. Matthew's Aramaic supposed the meaning to be "saving for the cause of fornication," he would naturally have used the

common *εἰ μὴ ἐπὶ πορνείᾳ*, or *πλὴν ἐπὶ πορνείᾳ* whereas the meaning of the words he used (*παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας*) is "excluding the plea of fornication," *i.e.*, I reject all plea of fornication. The unusual word *παρεκτός* was chosen to arrest attention, as it was not equivalent to *εἰ μὴ ἐπί*. So in Acts xxvi. 29 (*παρεκτὸς τῶν δεσμῶν τούτων*) I exclude these bonds.

Again in St. Matt. xix. 3, the Pharisees knowing that He had formally cancelled the Mosaic concession came to test Him, to see how He would get out of the charge of destroying the Law:—"Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for any cause whatever?" His answer is, No: and I annul the plea of fornication.

In St. Matt. xix. 9, Westcott and Hort read *εἰ μὴ ἐπὶ πορνείᾳ*, with C,E,F,H, but the reading *παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας* has what most would regard as the stronger support of B,D.

> "But I say to you (*λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν*), whosoever shall put away his wife, and I exclude the plea of fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery."

If He had meant to retain the plea of fornication, the words in St. Mark x. 11, are strangely at variance with it. The disciples in this passage clearly understood that our Lord excluded the plea of fornlcation. So St. Paul (in Rom. vii. 3, and in 1 Cor. vii. 10-11) does not admit fornication as a plea for divorce.

I may say that I owe the whole of this exegesis to Mr. G. H. Trench, who is a good Greek and Hebrew scholar, and I feel that there can be no doubt about Christ's absolute prohibition of divorce.

In the interests of national welfare I personally should be in favour of the State legalising unions, but I protest against the Church solemnizing civil marriages of divorced persons. Indeed I think that the Church would gain, if it were understood that a marriage duly solemnized by her could only be dissolved by death, although those who are merely civilly married before a Registrar could for sufficient reasons (such as infidelity, insanity lasting more than a year, persistent drunkenness, &c.), obtain a legal divorce.

17, *Claremont Place*, *Newcastle-on-Tyne.* A. S. Percival, M.B., M.A. (Camb.).

[The verdict of modern New Testament scholars is that Christ forbade Divorce peremptorily, and made no exception, and that the phrase *παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας* was not in the original evangelical source. The phrase is probably derived ultimately from Deut. xxiv. 1 (M.T.) through the Aramaic. (See the commentaries of W. C. Allen, A. H. McNeile, on St. Matthew, *in loc.*, and also Dean Savage's *Gospel of the Kingdom*, p. 113).

The serious question is whether the Church ought to treat the innocent divorced person in the same way as the guilty divorced person? To do so besides being most unjust to the innocent person must needs be detrimental to public morality. Another question arises, Is the marriage vow absolute? Is it not of the nature of a contract? If one party breaks the contract by infidelity is not the other party

absolved from their vow? We favour, as have a number of our archbishops and bishops, the solemnization by the Church of the second marriage of the innocent divorced person whilst the guilty partner is alive, but we are altogether opposed to the Church solemnizing the marriage of the guilty divorced person. Also in the interests of public morality we urge that the State should not legalise the union of such persons.

We, like our correspondent, favour the State granting Divorce (with, of course, the right to marry again) in a number of cases, *e.g.*, insanity, long terms of imprisonment, venereal disease, &c., but do not favour the solemnization of the marriage of these persons by the Church while their former partners are yet alive, as they have not been loosed from the vow of their previous marriage, yet we do not advocate their excommunication by the Church. We do, however, advocate the excommunication of guilty divorced persons and their partners until they are absolved by the Bishop.—Ed. *M.C.*].

TOWARDS HOME RE-UNION.

Sir, *To the Editor of* The Modern Churchman.

It is a strange fact, but it is nevertheless true, that no difficulty need arise in connection with the two Sacraments of Holy Baptism and the Holy Eucharist, if the Church of England should decide to take a great step forward in the direction of Home Re-union.

The validity of Lay Baptism is admitted in the Church of England. The Church of Rome admits the validity of Baptism with water in the Triune Name even when it is performed by those who are themselves unbaptized. The validity of Baptism by Nonconformist ministers, therefore, cannot be called in question.

As regards the Holy Communion there is this difference of opinion, which affords a practical basis for a *modus vivendi:* Churchmen generally regard the Holy Eucharist as separate and distinct from the primitive *Agape* or Love Feast; Nonconformists generally regard them as one and the same. Hence, when a Nonconformist minister celebrates the Holy Communion, he means by it no more than a Churchman understands by the disused *Agape.* Why, then, should not a Churchman and a Nonconformist, if they so desire, join in a common *Agape?* And considering that when a Nonconformist delivers the Bread and Wine they are not received kneeling, why should not a Churchman receive at the hands of a Nonconformist minister? Bishop Cosin, High Churchman as he was, advised English Churchmen travelling on the continent to receive the Holy Communion at the hands of non-Episcopalian ministers, rather than to attend the Roman Mass. Of course those amongst us whe believe in the Corporal Presence could not regard such a communion as a valid Eucharist, but only as a sacred feast commemorative of Christ's death; but why, in the name of charity, should they not join in it *as such* with those who regard it *as such and nothing more?*

In the ancient Church it was not a thing unknown for a layman to l consecrated bishop. The common explanation is, that Ordination to an ministerial office carries with it Ordination to the office of any and eve lower order not previously conferred. The Reformed Church of Engla has most wisely always scrupulously guarded the Apostolic Succession her Bishops; but previously to the Act of Uniformity of 1662 she did n always insist on Episcopal Ordination for her Priests and Deacons. Bisho Cosin, writing in 1650, said that he knew or had heard of many instances i which French Protestant non-Episcopalian ministers had been admitted a cure of souls in the Church of England, and that neither the Bishops no the law of the land required of them more than to make the usual declaration and to subscribe the Articles of Religion.

What is needed, in order to take a great step forward in the direction Home Re-union, is the repeal of that part of the Act of Uniformity *whi relates to Deacons' Orders*. There is nothing which properly pertains to t office of a deacon which in case of necessity a layman cannot perform. should again be in the power of the bishop, at his discretion, and und proper safeguards, to allow a Nonconformist minister to do the work of deacon in the Episcopal Church, either permanently or occasionally, at th request of the vicar and churchwardens of the parish. This partial retur to a godly custom, which was in vogue before civil war embittered t relations between Churchmen and Nonconformists, might ultimately lead a larger accession to the ministry of the mother Church from the ranks of learned and pious body of men, whose positive teaching is not contrary t our Prayer Book and Articles, but who object to "the Church of Englan as by law established," chiefly or wholly on account of the indignity whic an Act of Parliamedt puts upon them by denying or ignoring their status a Christian ministers.

There is nothing in this proposal that would in the least militate again the claims of any section of the Church of England. It would merely allo Nonconformist ministers to do under the bishop's license what is within t competence of any godly layman to do upon emergency, namely, to s prayers in consecrated buildings, to preach, to conduct classes, to visit t sick and whole, and to baptize. It is not suggested that any one should admitted to a benefice without episcopal ordination. The desire for clos union, which is evidenced from time to time by the invitation extended clergy of the Church of England to occupy Nonconformist pulpits, affor a strong presumption that there are many Nonconformist ministers w would gladly avail themselves of the liberty which this proposal wou accord to them; and the door would be shut against possible abuses b requiring the bishop's sanction to be previously obtained; which sanctio could, at any time, be withdrawn at the bishop's discretion. In submittin to these limitations a Nonconformist minister would not place himself in less favourable position than that occupied by every licensed curate.

Avenbury Vicarage, Bromyard. E. H. ARCHER-SHEPHERD.

***The Editor regrets that limitations of space have prevented the publication of a number of letters.